A puzzling question: Why would a major political party in a democratic country take a strong stance in opposition to any action on climate change? Heat deaths, extreme hurricanes and extreme fires, megadroughts and rising seas are impacting Republicans and Democrats alike, and will impact their descendants equally. And prior to 2010, a strand of environmentalism was strongly present within both the Republican electorate and elected officials. With climate change action or inaction very much on the ballot in 2024, this post provides some thoughts on the changes in the Republican position on climate in the last 15 years, largely excerpted from the forthcoming edition of my college textbook, Economics and the Environment (which includes all the references cited in the post).
Tracking the Transition
Since the early 1970s, poll takers have been asking Americans whether government is in general doing too little to protect the environment. Answering “yes” to this question means that for the purposes of this chapter, you are an “environmentalist.” Answering “no” means you are “industry friendly.” And answering “the right amount” means that you are neither. In 2018, by this definition, 62 percent of Americans were environmentalists, 9 percent fell into the industry friendly category, and the remaining 29 percent were happy with the status quo (Newport 2018).
Figure 12.3 (below) tracks the answers over time to two slightly different versions of this question, broken out by party affiliation. The top series shows that from 1974 to about 1986, while there were ups and downs, half or more of Republicans typically self-identified as environmentally concerned. During this period, Democrats were generally only 10 points higher in their “yes” responses than were Republicans. In 1990, note something remarkable. Following the first 2 years of widespread media coverage of climate change, an astounding 75 percent of Democrats and 75 percent of Republicans were calling for stronger government action to protect the environment.
Following that high point, Republican environmentalism dropped back to around the 50-percent mark through the 2008 election, and after that fell markedly into the low 40s. Meanwhile, Democratic environmental concern after 1990 stayed high, in the 70-percent range. So, by 2010, what had been a steady average 10-point gap from 1974 through the mid-1990s had widened to 30 points.
The second series begins in 2000, with 44 percent self-identified Republican environmentalists. Ignoring a short bump-up in 2016, the Republican number falls to the low 30s, before taking a second dive after the Trump election. By 2019 (not shown), only 25 percent of Republican voters considered themselves environmentalists. The second series also shows Democratic environmentalism on the rise, from 66 percent at the end of the Clinton administration in 2000 to 86 percent in 2019. Note the increasing concern among Democrats about lack of government action during the Bush administration, a decline during the Obama years, and then the big surge following 2016. So, in this second series, what started as a 22-point gap between the parties in 2000 rises to a staggering 60-point division in 2019.
Challenges to the Bi-Partisan Consensus
To summarize, we can see three periods in this data. From 1974 to about 1986, close to half of Republicans were self-identified environmentalists, with Democrats clocking in only 10 points higher. The “discovery” of climate change starting in 1988 drove Democratic concern up into mid-70-percent range, with Republicans following, but only for that one year of 1990.
It was this initial time frame from 1970 to 1992 during which all of our major environmental laws were passed—with most of them signed by Republican Presidents, Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. At the conclusion of this initial period in 1992, the first President Bush’s team negotiated an international treaty on global warming called “The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change” (UNFCCC), which was then ratified by the U.S. Senate 95-0 (More on this in Chapters 13 and 21). The UNFCCC was the last major piece of environmental legislation—more than 30 years ago now—passed by the U.S. Congress, until the IRA in 2022.
The second period, from 1990 to 2008, was a time of legislative stalemate, nationwide. Republican support for government action on the environment fell back in the 50-percent range, but as the second series shows it was softening, while Democratic environmentalism stayed high. Mainstream Republican support for the bipartisan environmental consensus was evident as late as 2008, when the two final contenders for the Republican nomination for President had both been leaders in promoting climate legislation—Mitt Romney while Governor of Massachusetts, and John McCain in the U.S. Senate.
The third period begins with Obama’s election in 2008, after which Republican support for environmental protection collapsed. Particularly after the 2010 congressional elections brought in a new wave of politicians opposed to action on climate change and in favor of regulatory rollbacks, national Republicans faced very strong incentives to oppose any climate legislation. Indeed, Romney flipped on his climate position in order to win the Republican Presidential nomination in 2012. Since 2016, further polarization during the Trump administration brought Republican support for action to protect the environment to a new low. Conversely, Trump’s election united almost all Democrats around a demand for greater action to protect the environment.
While public opinion has polarized, the division among elected politicians has become even more extreme. Note that today something like 25 to 35 percent of Republicans still say they want more government action to protect the environment. In particular, more than half of young Republicans (under 40) reported in 2019 that they were “very or extremely” concerned about their party’s position on climate change. But politicians must respond to activist voters in their “base.” Especially since 2010, Republican politicians in Washington who actively supported stronger environmental regulation or climate action have found themselves voted out of office through primary challenges from their right. And while groups of prominent Republican business people and economists continued to call for climate action, by 2016, of the 17 Republican candidates running for President, only one was in favor of climate legislation. Before and following the election, President Trump was highly vocal in his opposition, and in one of his first steps in office pulled the United States out of the Paris Climate Accord.
Did Climate Change Cause the Break-Up?
What was the cause of the decline in bipartisanship? Put another way, why did the Republican base become so concerned with climate change that they would vote out politicians who sought to take action on the issue? On the face of it, as a scientific phenomenon, climate change is a strange basis for polarization. This is not a political science book, so we will offer only three suggestions. First, partially as a result of social media, nations across the world are finding their populations polarized across a broad range of issues. Technology has enabled the rise of highly partisan (and very successful) profit-seeking news media whose business models involve stoking passions, and who have developed vested interests in promoting polarizing political leaders. This media environment has in turn enabled the rise of politicians who stoke fears through fake-news and conspiracy theories, the tactics of traditional demagogues. This new media landscape provided a ripe field for polarization.
The second ingredient that turned climate into a divisive issue was money. The fossil-fuel industry, along with a number of U.S. billionaires, have together devoted hundreds of millions of dollars to frame global warming as a partisan issue. The motivation of the latter group was ideological: climate change action, they feared, would justify extensive government intervention in the economy, the threat of “ecosocialism”. These dollars were used to spread doubt about the scientific consensus around climate change, to attack individual Republican politicians who advocate climate action, and to donate to their primary opponents. The critical role of the fossil-fuel industry can be seen in the fact that in conservative parties around the Western world, only in three countries where politics is dominated by oil and coal—the Unites States and Australia—has skepticism of climate science been an official party position.
Finally, these attacks were particularly effective as part of an “anti-elite” populism. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, environmental protection was plain “common-sense.” Air and water pollution, toxic waste dumps, and simple roadside litter were highly visible problems. By contrast, second-generation environmental challenges like climate change, species loss, and ocean acidification are complex and largely invisible. Right-wing populists have played off this complexity, and painted scientists and journalists who communicate about climate science as members of liberal “coastal elites” who are spreading fake news in order to alarm the public, sell media stories, and obtain research grants. In this way, one can begin to see why ignoring or opposing scientific evidence of climate change has become the dominant position in the Republican party.
Impacts On Environmental Protection
What did this new partisanship in both public opinion and leadership mean for U.S. environmental policy? Under the bipartisan consensus that held through 2016, the EPA was supposed to see itself, and to be seen by the public, as a non-partisan implementer of laws passed by congress. If directed by law to ensure that the air Americans breathed was safe, or that the U.S. waters were “fishable and swimmable,” then that was its role. As noted above, due to imperfect information about the state of the environment, these tasks could be done only imperfectly, and were subject to lobbying and political influence by both industry and environmentalists. But both the Republican and Democratic establishments officially agreed that in principle, the EPA should rely on the best science and best economics to craft regulations that met the mandated legislative goals.
By contrast, the new view that came in under President Trump was that in general, the EPA and other regulatory agencies have overreached in their mission. Scientists and economists are, according this view, politically liberal and untrustworthy. In support of their own agendas, it is alleged, they have taken over the EPA to lead to regulation that goes beyond legislative intent. To correct for this perceived overregulation, the Trump-led response was a wholesale replacement of agency heads and advisors who have scientific and technical backgrounds with former industry officials and industry lobbyists. The mission of these individuals after 2016 was to lead an across-the-board rollback of regulations to levels that place less of a burden on industry—regardless of any increased in pollution that would result.
Having explored how climate was sucked into the polarizing culture wars of the 2010’s and 20’s, this next post explores the actions taken under by the Trump 1.0 team, with an eye towards the likely impact of a Trump 2.0 Presidency.
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